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Abstract 
We argue that a capacity market is needed in most restructured electricity 
markets, and present a design that avoids problems found in the early capacity 
markets. The proposed market only rewards capacity that contributes to 
reliability as demonstrated by its performance during hours in which there is a 
shortage of operating reserves. The capacity price responds to market 
conditions, increasing when and where capacity is scarce and decreasing to zero 
when and where it is plentiful. Market power in the capacity market is addressed 
by basing the capacity price on actual capacity, rather than bid capacity, so 
generators cannot increase the capacity price by withholding supply. Actual 
peak energy rents (the short-run energy and reserve profits of a benchmark 
peaking unit) are subtracted from the capacity price. This allows the capacity 
market to more accurately control short-run profits and suppresses market power 
in the energy market. This design both avoids and hedges energy market risk, 
and by suppressing market power avoids regulatory risk. Risk reduction saves 
consumers money as do the performance and investment incentives inherent in 
the pay-for-performance mechanism.  
Capacity markets have proven to be one of the most contentious elements of 
electricity restructuring. Many argue there is no need for a capacity market. Others argue 
that, while they may be needed, the current designs are woefully inadequate, and are 
dominated by having no market at all (Cramton 1999) or alternative instruments (Chao 
and Wilson 2004; Oren 2004). Still others argue capacity markets are essential for 
encouraging sufficient investment in new capacity (Besser, Farr and Tierney 2002; Stoft 
2002). We argue that a capacity market is needed in most restructured electricity markets, 
and present a design that avoids the many problems found in the early capacity markets. 
ISO New England (ISO-NE) has proposed a design for the New England market that 
relies on the principles we present here. 
Fundamentally, the capacity market we propose is an incentive mechanism to induce 
supply to invest in sufficient generation in the right locations and of the right type to 
satisfy a reliability standard at least cost. The capacity market provides strong incentives 
for suppliers to perform when most needed, reduces risk for both generators and load, and 
addresses market power both in the capacity market and in the spot energy market. 
                                                 
1 Cramton@umd.edu; Steven@Stoft.com. We are grateful to ISO-NE for asking us to think on this topic 
and especially to its staff and board for many helpful discussions. The views expressed are our own. 
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Why have a capacity market? 
Most markets do not need to price capacity to promote efficient long-run investment. 
Pricing the primary good is sufficient. The balance of supply and demand in the spot 
market determines a clearing price, which in turn determines short-run profits for 
capacity. In the long-run equilibrium, capacity enters until the point where the expected 
short-run profit is equal to the carrying costs of marginal capacity. As supply tightens or 
demand expands, short-run profits increase, and this sends a “build” signal to suppliers.  
Current electricity markets have an important market failure—the absence of a 
robust demand side—which motivates the need for a capacity market. Today, there is 
little demand response to the energy price, primarily because most load neither sees nor 
pays the real-time price. Real-time meters and demand management control systems are 
not yet in place for most electricity consumers. This absence prevents load’s willingness 
to curtail demand to set the price during times of supply scarcity. Furthermore, the market 
structure is imperfectly competitive, especially in load pockets. As a result, there are 
instances when one or more suppliers has substantial market power, especially at peak 
times or during an outage of a large generator or transmission line. 
These market failures require that (1) prices during shortage hours—those hours in 
which energy and operating reserve requirements are not fully met—be set 
administratively, and (2) rules be in place to monitor and mitigate bids in situations 
where market power is likely. Unfortunately, addressing these market failures typically 
results in price peaks that are too infrequent and short to motivate efficient investment in 
new capacity. Theoretically, it would be possible to set shortage prices sufficiently high 
to provide sufficient investment incentives, as is the case with value of lost load (VOLL) 
pricing (see Stoft 2002), but this approach entails estimating VOLL—a nearly impossible 
task. Moreover, it exposes load to greater price risk in real time, and the high shortage 
prices encourage generators to withhold supply to create shortages, which undermines 
reliability. Thus, in practice, shortage prices have generally been set at levels on the order 
of $1000, and even lower, such as the $250 cap in the California market during a time of 
great scarcity (2000-2001). In contrast, the value of lost load estimates are often in the 
$10,000 to $20,000 range. 
A capacity market can supplement the revenues a generator can get from the energy 
and reserves markets. This capacity revenue allows regulators to set shortage prices at 
politically acceptable low levels, and yet generators still can be motivated to make 
efficient investment and operating decisions. However, for this to be the case, the 
capacity market must be carefully designed. 
A complementary alternative view of the need for capacity markets is gained from 
the reliability perspective. Besides high shortage prices and capacity markets, other 
approaches to inducing sufficient investment for reliability have been proposed, among 
them enforcement of a high level of long-term contracting and increased demand 
response. When evaluating all of these proposals it should be kept in mind that no purely 
market-based solution to the reliability-investment problem is possible until consumers 
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can purchase reliability and this is impossible until a sufficiently large set of consumers 
can be individually and controllably disconnected during a supply shortage.2 
Until individualized customer reliability is possible, all approaches except a very 
responsive demand side require at least one crucial administrative input. Shortage pricing 
requires an estimate of the VOLL. A capacity market requires an estimate of the reliable 
capacity level. And long-term contracting requires specification of the mandatory energy 
option contracts, the penalty for a failure to hold sufficient options, and the penalty for 
failure to perform when called. Notice that at least in shortage situations, the penalty for 
nonperformance needs to be set administratively at a level above the spot energy price to 
provide sufficient incentive for investment. Otherwise, the option price would be 
bounded above by the cost of nonperforming assets, which face a penalty equal to the 
capped and mitigated spot energy price minus the strike price whenever called to supply 
energy. 
The demand response approach is in a different category because it does not induce a 
reliable level of investment. Instead it makes a range of investment levels reliable and 
induces the least-production-cost level of investment. Reliability is achieved by demand 
responding almost instantly to price rather than through operating reserves—otherwise it 
would still be the administrative control of operating reserves that determined reliability 
and not the market. 
Early markets were fatally flawed 
Early capacity markets did not come close to an efficient design. In their worst form, 
the markets simply were a means of transferring an arbitrary amount of money from load 
to generation, without load getting anything of value for the purchase. The markets were 
simple and seemingly sensible. Every month, generators would offer their capacity in a 
uniform price auction. The system operator (ISO) would accept the offers—lowest price 
first—until the required quantity of capacity was procured. All generators accepted were 
paid the market clearing price for each kW-month of capacity they offered. 
Market power. A major problem with this design stems from the vertical demand 
curve and the short-term offer. For capacity offered on a monthly basis, the opportunities 
are limited, and hence the true marginal cost of this capacity is near zero. Thus, the 
competitive outcome is determined from the intersection of the true supply curve (near 
zero up to the system capacity and then infinite) and the demand curve (vertical at the 
capacity requirement), as shown in Figure 1. This yields a competitive price near zero, 
whenever the system capacity is sufficient to satisfy the requirement, which through 
planning should be all the time. This near-zero price gives large suppliers a strong 
incentive to exercise market power by bidding their supply at high prices, as shown 
below. A supplier is much better off supplying a reduced quantity at a high price than its 
full quantity at a price near zero. 
                                                 
2 It is not sufficient that distribution companies be individually interruptible because their distaste for 
blackouts is not intrinsically determined but is instead determined by an administered penalty. 
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The experience with this market suggests that, although it may be possible to sustain 
something close to the competitive price much of the time, suppliers do eventually figure 
out that higher bids are more profitable. The result is that the price is determined by the 
willingness of suppliers to exercise market power, rather than the efficient interaction 
between true demand and supply. 
Product measurement. A second basic problem is the measurement of supply. All 
of the ICAP markets in the East Coast rewarded capacity based on availability—a unit 
that is 90% available gets 90% of the ICAP price. This is sensible, but the measurement 
of availability in all these markets was and is poor. Namely, the resource is paid for ICAP 
based on average availability over non-maintenance hours. This is done with the use of 
an engineering formula developed over the past thirty years for an entirely different 
purpose. It measures not how well a unit performs, but how well it performs relative to 
expectations for a unit of this type—and even then loopholes are provided. This measure 
is called EFOR’d and it is convenient because the data is collected anyway, but it is 
misguided and gameable.  
To see the folly of this approach, imagine a “dog” plant with high marginal cost that 
is extremely difficult to get running. It would never want to be called for energy, because 
if it were called it would not be able to deliver; hence, it would bid into the energy market 
at an extremely high offer price ($1000) with a high start-up cost and a long (12 hour) 
start time, and a long minimum run time. Such a unit would never be called for energy. 
Even in crisis, when the ISO would gladly pay $1000 per MWh, the unit is not called, 
because the ISO believes that the crisis would have passed before this unit can get online. 
In spite of this, the unit will have a high EFOR’d that depends on its forced outage rate 
and it rarely breaks down when running. The unit receives the same ICAP payment as 
well-maintained baseload or peaking units that are often providing energy or reserves,. 
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Clearly, the “dog” plant contributes little to reliability, and its efficient ICAP payment 
should be near 0%, not 100%, of the full payment. 
Elements of a successful market design 
A capacity market must induce the right amount of investment of the right type in the 
right locations. Since it is also possible for a well designed capacity market to reduce risk 
and market power associated with the energy market, it should do this as well. Inducing 
the right amount of investment, though always controversial due to the large revenues 
involved, may actually be the simplest of these goals. 
Total capacity. Inducing a particular level of investment, k*, is mainly a matter of 
paying more than the fixed cost of a peaker when there is less capacity than k* and less 
when there is more capacity. Of course, one must take into account how much more and 
how much less and revenues from the energy market. It is simplest to start by considering 
the sum of ICAP revenues and the energy rents of a peaker, which will be termed peak-
energy rents (PER). This combined stream is the fixed-cost recovery or short-run profit 
(SRπ) of a peaker, and should be the initial subject of design. Short-run profit is a 
function because it varies with the amount of installed capacity. (ISO-NE calls this the 
ICAP demand curve.) The most obvious shape for SRπ(k) is a step function, as in Figure 
2, which goes from 2 FC* on the left of k* to zero to the right, where FC* is the long-run 
annualized fixed-cost of a benchmark peaker. If, over time, capacity, k, is symmetrically 
distributed about k*, then it will earn, in expectation, FC*. 






The argument that we should expect this function to induce k* (provided FC* 
includes the appropriate risk-adjusted return on capital) runs as follows. If investors 
expected k to average less than k*, then they would expect actual fixed-cost recovery to 
average more than FC*. In this case they would invest more than they are investing. In 
equilibrium they will expect k to equal k*, so we should too, since we cannot possibly 
have more accurate expectations on our own than do investors. The principal drawback to 
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the use of this step function is that it causes short-run profits to be riskier than necessary, 
which will be discussed shortly. The cure is to reduce its slope near k*. 
Capacity type and behavior. Inducing the right type of capacity is more difficult, 
but an indirect approach provides a solution. The shortfall of capacity occurs because, 
when capacity averages k*, peakers cannot cover their fixed costs. If they could, they 
would invest until k = k*, and there would be no shortage. This proves that the missing 
energy market revenues are missing from the hours when price rises above the marginal 
cost of a peaker. In a competitive market, prices are this high only when all peakers are in 
use. These times will be referred to as the peak hours. 
Traditional capacity-market designs essentially pay back the missing peak-hour 
revenues during all hours of the year. Since during peak hours, the price is above the 
marginal cost of a peaker (the highest-marginal-cost generator the market would build) it 
is also above the marginal cost of all but some out-of-date generators that would no 
longer be built. In fact it is higher than the marginal cost of all but a few old peakers. 
Hence peak-hour revenues should flow to almost all generators in the market. If this were 
precisely true, paying peak revenues in proportion to megawatts of capacity installed 
would be equivalent to paying revenues on peak. This is the assumption behind 
traditional capacity market designs. 
Reality is more complex. Peak-hour energy prices send different signals than per-
megawatt capacity prices. If the additional capacity had been induced by a well 
functioning, unregulated power market, the additional revenues would have flowed 
through the energy market, and as just argued, those revenues would have flowed during 
peak hours. Since these prices would have been determined by supply and demand, we 
can be sure the signals sent by these prices would have been signals for efficient 
behavior. In practice, such behaviors include, keeping your coal unfrozen in the winter, 
having appropriate gas contracts in place, expediting parts delivery to recover quickly 
from a forced outage, and improving maintenance. All of these are actual examples, but 
what may be more important is the examples we have not yet thought of, but which well-
motivated suppliers will think of. Paying them regardless of performance will not provide 
such motivation.  
Besides these short-run examples there are long-run examples. On-peak payments 
will reward generation that can start quickly and ramp up quickly as well as baseload 
generation, which is online most of the time. Conversely, older generators, near 
retirement, will be signaled to retire sooner if they cannot provide capacity when it is 
most needed and later if they can. This is exactly as it should be. Hence a proper 
capacity-market design will return the missing revenues to the generators by making 
capacity payments during peak hours. 
Capacity location. The location of new investment is important. The fact that peak-
hour energy revenues are missing indicates that the locational signals of nodal energy 
pricing have been distorted. It might be thought that making capacity payments on-peak 
would restore the missing part of the nodal-price signal. That would be true if capacity 
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prices were simply proportional to some energy price-spike that had been reduced by 
some constant fraction, but the distortion of energy price is more complex. 
Because of these difficulties, the market must be divided into zones for which 
different k*’s can be estimated. In fact this is already common engineering practice. This 
approach can only approximate the ideal locational signal, but given that some detailed 
locational signal is still provided by the energy market, this approach should work 
reasonably well. Once different k*’s have been estimated, these will determine different 
short-run profit functions and different capacity payments in the different zones. These 
different payments are determined by treating the short-run profit functions as demand 
curves (hence ISO-NE’s name for them), taking note of the transmission constraints 
between zones, and computing “zonal prices” as competitive equilibrium prices subject to 
zonal transmission constraints. These zonal prices serve as the capacity-market’s setting 
of short-run profits. 
As an example, suppose the Boston zone has 4 GW of capacity, and its short-run 
profit function indicates $9/kW-month of revenues when capacity is this short, but there 
is plenty of capacity in the rest-of-pool zone and the price there would be $2/kW-month. 
The price difference will cause a maximal “inflow” of capacity over the available 
transmission and this will result in a lower “zonal price” in Boston, which is read from 
Boston’s demand curve at 4 GW plus the transmission limit. 
Risk reduction. Capacity markets are inherently less risky than energy markets 
because their prices fluctuate only based on the level of installed capacity and not 
because of weather. Energy-market prices suffer fluctuations for both reasons. Moreover, 
with proper implementation, capacity markets can hedge the remaining weather-related 
fluctuations of the energy market. In a hot year with higher-than-normal average PER, 
capacity market payments can be reduced by the increase in PER. In this way all annual 
weather-related risk can be removed from the market. 
Another feature of energy market revenues is that their expected value is a steep 
function of capacity in the vicinity of FC* and they do not flatten out on the left like the 
step function considered above. In fact they increase exponentially on the left. The result 
is that a symmetrical distribution of k that produces FC* on average will do so by 
providing several times FC* in a few years and much less than FC* in many years. 
Investors find such income streams risky. Long-run contracts can eliminate this risk if 
they cover an investor’s total costs. But not all investments can be covered this way, 
otherwise there would be no meaningful spot-market price to arbitrage long-run contracts 
against. In practice, investors face considerable exposure both to spot market prices and 
to long-run contract prices based on predictions of future spot market prices. The result, 
at present, is an investment market with a high risk premium, especially compared with 
regulated markets. This is simply a dead-weight loss, and one that can be considerably 
reduced with a well designed capacity market. 
If the short-run profit function is given a moderate slope so that short-run profits 
decline gradually over, for example, a 15 percent range of installed capacity, profit 
fluctuations can be considerably dampened. This reduces the remaining investment risk. 
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Market power in the spot energy market. A beneficial side-effect of subtracting 
actual PER from the capacity payment is that it eliminates much of the market power in 
the energy market. Typically this is exercised when capacity is in short supply which 
means the energy price is already at the marginal cost of a peaker. In this state, market 
power will inevitably push prices higher and result in an increase in PER. Any generator 
receiving capacity payments will find this increase deducted from its capacity payment. 
Consequently most exercises of such market power will no longer be profitable. 
Features of the New England design 
The New England capacity market will be monthly, and although a good case can be 
made for an annual market, there are theoretical advantages to a monthly market when 
neighboring ISO’s have different annual load profiles. For example, if one is winter 
peaking and the other summer peaking, it makes sense to sell capacity into one in the 
winter and the other in the summer. This is difficult for an annual market to arrange. 
The New England market is bordered by the NYISO, which unfortunately does not 
recognize that the value of capacity fluctuates during the year. Consequently, ISO-NE has 
had to consider a second-best solution to match this flaw in NYISO’s ICAP market (or 
New York must reform its market). If ISO-NE had priced capacity economically it would 
have bought capacity from NYISO during summer months even when it had relatively 
much more capacity then NYISO. This is because NYISO’s summer capacity is under-
priced, quite likely by a factor of two or more. While this might be beneficial for ISO-
NE, it is not socially efficient. 
The monthly market described here is stylized but based roughly on the ISO-NE 
proposal now before FERC. To reduce seams issues with the neighboring New York 
market, the design does not recognize seasonal fluctuations in the value of capacity. 
The short-run profit function. The first piece of the design is a short-run profit 
function. This function should be designed to minimize the total cost of power and un-
served load, while inducing some target level of capacity CTarget. Hitting the target is 
relatively easy. Minimizing costs is a problem that requires much data for which there are 
simply no reasonable engineering or statistical estimates. 
The two keys to cost minimization are risk minimization and lost-load minimization. 
Little is known quantitatively about either of these. We do know that an extremely steep 
SR profit function is very risky. For instance, one that pays $20,000/MWh below a 
threshold and nothing above the threshold (rather like VOLL pricing) will produce an 
erratic and thus risky profit stream. We also know that a nearly flat SR profit function 
will send weak signals about how much capacity is needed. This will either cause high 
costs from lost-load if it is too low, or high cost from extreme over building if it is too 
high. 
The curve, shown in Figure 3, which is reminiscent of the short-run profit function in 
Stoft (2002, p. 178), is quite close to the New England ISO’s proposed design. The 
primary goal when developing this curve was to minimize the chance of serious error. 
The expected carrying cost of the benchmark peaker (FC*) plays an important role, since 
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this is the profit that needs to be recovered on average for an investment in capacity to be 
marginally profitable. A second critical input is the objective capability CMin—the 
amount of capacity needed to keep loss of load events that result from insufficient 
resources to a frequency of 1 day in 10 years. All capacity measures are scaled relative to 
CMin. 




2×FC* Locational ICAP Demand Curve
CMin = 1 = Objective Capability





With FC* and CMin in hand, the demand curve is nearly nailed down from the 
following three conditions:  
1. SRπ (CMin) = 2 × FC*. 
2. SRπ (CK) = FC* 
3. (CMax – CK) / (CK – CMin ) = 3 
There, however, remains one condition, which will determine CMax (and thus CK from 
condition 3): the expected value of SR profits over the distribution of capacities equals 
FC*, so the benchmark peaker just breaks even in the long run. To compute this expected 
value, we assume that capacity is normally distributed with standard deviation SD, which 
is estimated from prior years, and mean CTarget = CMin + .94 SD. This implies a 17% 
chance that capacity will be below the amount required to meet the 1-day-in-10-year 
standard. In New England, CTarget = 1.054. The expected profit condition, then, implies 
the capacity price falls to zero at CMax = 1.150, and the kink in the demand curve occurs 
at CK = 1.038, just to the left of CTarget. 
Subtracting actual peak energy and reserve rents. An interesting aspect of this 
design is that the curve shown above is not the ICAP payment curve but the SR profit 
function itself. More specifically, it is the SR profit function for the benchmark generator 
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which, in this case, is a peaker (a “Frame” gas turbine). SR profit, SRπ, is the sum of peak 
energy and reserve rents, PER, and the ICAP payment, ICpay. In order to control SR 
profits according to this function it is necessary to set ICpay equal to SRπ – PER. 
The NYISO has been explicitly subtracting something like PER from its equivalent 
of the SRπ(k), since 2003, so the basic idea is not new. But NYISO estimates PER in 
advance for unspecified but presumably average conditions. With few years of data to 
work with, and with market rules changing frequently, this estimation process is murky, 
fraught with difficulty and controversial. The main problem is, of course, predicting 
energy price spikes which are known to be erratic and unpredictable.  
ISO-NE  uses an ex post approach. It simply waits until prices happen and then 
subtracts the PER based upon the actual energy prices. This is much easier and less 
controversial. Still some difficulty remains because, when the energy price jumps from 
$50 to $500 for three hours, it is difficult to estimate how much of that price spike would 
be captured by an actual benchmark unit. It might be on line already, or it might take half 
an hour to start. Or it might not start for an hour because it spent half an hour trying to 
decide if the price spike would last more than half an hour. Fortunately the behavior of 
peakers is much more easily studied and far more predictable than the behavior of price 
spikes. In any case, this dispatch problem must be solved whether the NYISO or the ISO-
NE approach is used. 
Besides simplicity and accuracy, ex-post PER estimates have two major economic 
advantages. First, they reduce energy-market risk, and second they reduce energy-market 
market power. Consider a typical year with C = CK. In the ISO-NE market, a supplier can 
be sure that the benchmark generator will earn SRπ = FC* no matter how the summer 
weather turns out, what nukes go out, or who exercises market power. In an ex-ante PER 
design, the ICAP payment will be known with this same certainty, but PER will be as 
uncertain as always. Thus SRπ will be as uncertain as always, which is considerably 
riskier than having SRπ known in advance. 
Besides stabilizing SR profits, ex-post PER reduces market power. Just as real 
scarcity caused by hot weather cannot raise SR profits, so artificial scarcity caused by 
withholding cannot raise SR profits. Any increase is just subtracted out of ICpay. Since 
market power often raises price above the marginal cost of a peaker, much energy-market 
market power will be eliminated by the ex-post PER calculation.  
The reduction in market power would be more complete and the calculation of PER 
simplified if all prices above the marginal cost of the benchmark peaker were counted 
towards PER, thus assuming that the benchmark peaker is available for energy whenever 
the price exceeds its marginal cost. Real peakers are not so reliable, so this would require 
that a correction factor be applied to the calculated PER, based on several years of past 
peaker performance. Such an approach is recommended here. 
Annual smoothing of PER. PER will fluctuate dramatically during the year, but 
under the current design SRπ does not. As explained earlier this is to match the flaw in 
the NYISO design. If monthly PER were used, this would result in ICpay being least in 
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August when PER is greatest. To avoid this, PER is averaged over the twelve months 
prior to the monthly ICAP auction. In this way it stays reasonably flat as does SRπ and it 
is known with certainty at the time of the auction. Actual PER is still subtracted but over 
a twelve month period. 
Relationship to forward reserve market. New England is unusual in that it has a 
forward reserve market to procure offline reserves well in advance of the spot market. 
This market has proved essential in motivating the supply of flexible resources during a 
period without an efficient capacity market. Following the introduction of LICAP, the 
forward reserve market will play a less important role in providing incentives for flexible 
resources, since these resources will be substantially rewarded by LICAP. However, the 
forward reserve market will continue to provide additional compensation to reserve 
resources to the extent they are undersupplied in a particular location. Most importantly, 
the forward reserve market sets a locational price for reserves well in advance of the spot 
market. In this way, the price reflects the economic costs of reserve supply from units 
other than quick start generators, such as dispatchable load or slow-start units that 
provide reserves from ramping. 
Availability scoring. As explained above, when there is sufficient capacity for 
reliability purposes, suppliers make too little. This means peakers make too little, which 
means revenue is missing from peak hours. This is the failure that the ICAP market must 
remedy, and it should do so by returning the money during peak hours. In theory it should 
be paid exactly when price distortions occur. The simplest theory would say this happens 
only when the price hits the cap, but it appears that ISOs engage in more complex price 
distortions than this. What is certain is that peakers must be missing revenues for fixed 
cost recovery, otherwise investors would build peakers until there was a reliable level of 
capacity. 
From a practical point of view, one wants to pay the installed-capacity payment, 
ICpay, only when the incentive for more supply is clearly a beneficial incentive. When 
the system runs short of NERC-required operating reserves, there can be little question 
that more supply is called for. Thus a rule that pays more only when the system runs short 
of operating reserves is a safe rule from an efficient dispatch perspective. Similarly, there 
would seem little harm to inducing more supply when the price is expected to hit $1000. 
In fact inducing more supply any time the price is high enough to induce every bit of 
available supply seems quite safe. Hence, if the most expensive old generator on the 
system has a marginal cost of $300/MWh, then all hours with higher prices or operating 
reserve shortages can be declared “shortage hours” and used for paying ICpay. 
The next question is how to implement payment during these hours. If there are two 
shortage hours in a month with an ICpay of $8,000/MW, then each hour can be assigned 
$4,000/MW and every supplier is then paid an extra $4,000/MWh for each MWh of 
energy or reserves delivered during these two hours. This has two problems. First, it is 
risky for the suppliers. Second, most months will have no shortage hours. A less direct 
approach solves both problems. 
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Generating units are given an Availability Score, AG, determined by the fraction of 
shortage hours during which the generator is available. If this score is 90%, then the 
generator receives 90% of ICpay. The Availability Score is determined using an 
exponentially weighted moving average, which is accomplished by proportional updating 
as follows. 
Availability updating. AG is updated following each shortage hour based on the old 
AG and AHG—the actual hourly availability during the shortage: 
New AG = ( 95 × Old AG + 5 × AHG ) / 100. 
This is repeated for every shortage hour since the last update in the order of its 
occurrence. AG is initially set at the unit’s EFOR’d value. If no shortage hours occurred, 
then AG is not updated. All generators are updated according to their performance and 
without regard to their trading position in the LICAP, or any other, market, except for 
ICAP importers, which are evaluated only during months in which they sell ICAP to the 
ISO. 
Note that when a generator is available in a shortage hour its AG is increased by 5% 
relative to what it would have been had it missed the shortage hour. This increase affects 
all future hours. Because of the exponential weighting, the total impact is exactly 100%. 
Because losing future income is less costly than losing present income, the incentive is 
somewhat weakened, but is strong nonetheless.  










ICAP market power. ICAP markets have steep demand curves and can have 
significant supplier concentration, especially inside of constrained zones. Hence, market 
power can be a serious problem if the market is not designed correctly. The trick is to 
simply ignore supplier bids when computing the market price, as shown in Figure 4, and 
base the price on the actual capacity in the market. Since supply bids determine who 
supplies, but not the price paid for supply, no supplier can affect the market price by 
withholding supply, and hence no supplier has market power. Since supplier bids do not 
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determine price (SRπ), what does. The answer is ICAP. After all, controlling the level of 
installed capacity is the sole motivation for paying ICpay, so the appropriate feedback for 
controlling price is the capacity variable. Fortunately, the ISO knows exactly how much 
ICAP exists each month, as does the market, so the process is completely transparent. 
Note that this is not a market power mitigation mechanism. In such a market, 
suppliers have no market power so mitigation is not necessary. Compared with fixed 
price caps or elaborately variable price caps such as used in NY and sometimes in CA, 
this approach is a non-invasive way to deal with potential market power problems. 
Supplier bids still perform the function suppliers need them to perform. They can no 
longer use them to control the market price (exercise market power) but they can still use 
them, as they should, to signal whether they wish to sell at the market price. They are 
price takers, exactly as in a competitive market. 
Conclusion 
Capacity markets are needed in today’s restructured electricity markets.3 This need 
arises because current power markets have no ability to sell reliability and the high 
administered shortage prices required to induce a reliable level of capacity are generally 
suppressed by various market-power mitigation measures. By restoring the missing peak 
energy revenues, capacity markets attempt to create efficient investment incentives. 
However, current capacity markets have serious weaknesses. These weaknesses will 
likely lead to the failure of the markets, if the designs are not fixed. 
The New York capacity market is an example of one of the better capacity markets. 
It uses a downward sloping demand curve to determine the capacity price, and this price 
is determined on a locational basis, recognizing transmission constraints. Thus, the 
capacity compensation is responsive to locational supply scarcity. This is a good thing 
and is the primary reason that the New York market appears to be working well. 
However, the New York market has four major flaws: 
1. Suppliers in constrained zones have an incentive to exercise market power in 
the LICAP market. 
2. Suppliers have an incentive to create real-time shortages. 
3. Peak energy rents are estimated without regard to the capacity level or the 
actual energy prices.  
4. Generating units are paid LICAP even if they are unable to supply energy or 
reserves in shortage hours. 
The proposed market in New England addresses each of these flaws: 
                                                 
3 A requirement for energy options at various strike prices is a viable alternative. See Chao and Wilson 
(2004) and Oren (2004). This approach, if implemented at the state level, is problematic in electricity 
markets like New England that include many small states, since a lack of coordination among states likely 
would introduce market distortions. 
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1. The capacity price is determined from actual capacity, rather than bid 
capacity, so no supplier has an incentive to exercise market power in the 
LICAP market. 
2. Ex post peak energy and reserve rents are subtracted from the LICAP price. 
Thus, a LICAP supplier does not have an incentive to create real-time 
shortages—the high shortage price resulting from the shortage is subtracted 
from the LICAP price, so there is no net gain from the high price. This 
eliminates the second and third flaws. 
3. LICAP is paid to suppliers based only on their demonstrated ability to supply 
energy or reserves in shortage hours. Thus, only supply that contributes to 
reliability is rewarded. 
PJM has proposed a capacity market with much different timing than either New 
England or New York. In PJM, the capacity auction occurs four years ahead for a one-
year capacity product. This long lead time has the advantage that potential new entrants 
can compete with incumbents in offering capacity. However, such a design means that 
market power in the capacity auction cannot be addressed as simply as in the New 
England approach. Moreover, it is unclear whether the four-year-ahead one-year price 
signal will be a better motivator of efficient investment than the monthly signal in New 
England, which is easily estimated even several years in advance from estimates of New 
England capacity. 
One might infer that the New England capacity market is a means of allowing a low 
energy price cap and yet still provide compensation to generators to motivate sufficient 
investment. This, however, is the wrong interpretation. In our proposal, the generator 
receives a large reward—much more than the price cap—for providing energy and 
reserves during shortages. Further, the market hedges the administrative shortage price. 
This means that little volume is actually transacted at the shortage price, which should 
enable setting a higher shortage price more in line with the value of lost load. 
Two essential elements of good market design are illustrated in the New England 
approach. First, careful attention to product measurement means that suppliers have the 
correct incentives to supply what load values: capacity that supplies energy or reserves at 
times of shortage, and thus capacity that contributes to reliability. Second, market power 
in both the energy and capacity markets is addressed in a simple and robust way. The end 
result should be a capacity market that all participants can trust to lead to efficient 
behavior both in the short run and the long run.  
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